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RULES OF ORIGIN FOR TEXTILES: IMPLEMENTING
LEGISLATION FOR GATT
Janice Wingo
Abstract: This Comment discusses the changes in the rules of origin for textiles that
were implemented after the United States joined the World Trade Organization. The
changes were made in such a way as to protect U.S. domestic textile production from
Chinese competition even though these changes were couched in terms of harmonizing
U.S. customs regulations with those of the rest of the world.
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 8, 1994, President Clinton signed the "Uruguay Round
Agreements Act,"' legislation which implements the latest round of special
agreements of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GAT"). Key
members of the House and Senate authored amendments to the textiles and
apparel section of this GATT implementing legislation.2  These amend-
ments, passed in the enabling legislation, re-classify the origin of clothing
from where the fabric is cut to where the garment is assembled. The spon-
sors argue that this would bring U.S. law in line with the way Europeans
and Canadians classify the origin of garments, thus fulfilling a GATT
requirement to "harmonize" tariff rules between countries.3 This Comment
argues that the main purpose of these amendments is to protect the U.S.
textiles industry from cheaper, Chinese-made garments which will be barred
from entering the U.S. under the new classification. Not only will Chinese
and Hong Kong textile manufacturers be adversely affected as a result of
I The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (effective Jan.
1, 1995) [hereinafter Uruguay Round].. This law is also known as H.R. 5110 and S. 2467.
2 See Rule of Origin for Textiles and Apparel, 1994: Hearings on H.RR 51!0 Before the House
Ways and Means Committee, 103rd Cong., 2d. Sess. (1994) (amendment of Representative Benjamin
Cardin, Democrat from Baltimore, Maryland, Member of the House Ways and Means Committee).
Senator John Breaux, Democrat from Louisiana, authored a similar amendment to the Senate Finance
Committee. See House-Senate Conferees, At First Meeting Clear Way for Action on GATT Trade Bill,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1290 (Aug. 24, 1994).
The textile and apparel section appears at § 334 of the GATT implementing legislation. See
Uruguay Round, supra note 1, § 334.
3 Uruguay Round Table Agreements Draft Implementing Proposal, Summary of Uruguay Round
Table Trade Agreements and Proposals to Implement Such Agreements, pan. I I (June 29, 1994)
[hereinafter GAIT Draft Implementing Proposal], available in LEXIS, ITRADE Library, GATT File.
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this legislation, U.S. consumers will pay "hundreds of millions of dollars' 4
more each year for clothing; and they could face higher prices for other
Chinese-made goods if China retaliates.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the objectives of
GATT and how those objectives are codified into law. Then it also
discusses how the Multifiber Arrangement ("MvFA"), a series of bilateral
treaties erecting textile quotas, violates both GATT principles and law. The
theory of comparative advantage is briefly set out to explain the economics
behind Hong Kong-Chinese partnerships in garment manufacturing. Part III
acquaints the reader with the Uruguay Round and the effect of phasing-out
quotas administered under the MFA, and argues that the changes in U.S.
Customs regulations implementing the Uruguay Round are protectionist.
Part IV suggests a way for Customs regulations to be applied in a less
protectionist manner.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the GA TT
At the end of the Second World War, the Allies sought to undo the
damaging effects of import duties imposed in the 1930s.5 British and
American officials proposed a new international economic order.6 Freer
trade was to be the cornerstone of this post-war economic system, and the
International Trade Organization ("ITO") was envisioned to be the basic
institution for governing world trade. 7 When it became apparent that the
U.S. Senate would not pass the Havana Charter authorizing the ITO, 8
President Truman withdrew the bill in 1948. 9
4 This is an estimate according to Julia K. Hughs, vice-president of Associated Merchandising
Corporation, which owns Carter Hawley Hale, Dayton Hudson and other retailers. Peter Behr, Clothing
Industry Seeks Stricter Import Rules, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1994, at Di.
5 See BELA BALASSA, COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
206 (1989). The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1401a (1988), is an example of such a
damaging tariff. ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 209 (1991).
6 Id. at219.
7 Id.
8 According to a former State Department official, William Diebold, Jr., the Senate did not approve
of the broad scope of the ITO. In addition to the rules for tariffs, quotas and exchange controls, the ITO
embraced policies for full employment and stability in the world raw material market. U.S. business inter-
ests were particularly critical of the employment provisions of the treaty. William Diebold, Jr., The End of
the ITO, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, Oct. 1952, at 4, 12. Two other reasons for the failure of
Congress to endorse the ITO were changes in the international landscape between 1945 and 1950-mostly
VOL. 4 No. 2
RULES OF ORIGIN FOR TEXTILES
Prior to the death of the ITO, twenty-three major trading nations,
including the United States, negotiated agreements (known collectively as
the "General Agreement" or GATr10) in Geneva in 1947 to reduce tariffs
and other barriers to trade. 1' The signatories to the 1947 General
Agreement wanted to record the agreements reached in Geneva and to
insure that the participants did not subvert those agreements prior to the ITO
coming into existence. 12 While the General Agreement incorporated many
of the substantive trade issues of the Havana Charter, such as reducing
tariffs and other barriers to trade,13 it was not intended to be the framework
for governing world trade.14 When the United States failed to endorse the
ITO, it effectively died. No other body was created for governing world
trade.15 As the former Director-General of GATT remarked, "the failure of
the Havana Charter to come into force left a vacuum in the organization of
economic relations in the post-war period."16 GATT was the only agree-
ment left concerning world trade; yet it did not contain any mechanism for
enforcement.
Because GATT was not intended as a permanent framework govern-
ing international trade, GATT has evolved pragmatically over time. The
1947 Agreement did not call for future negotiating sessions. Nevertheless,
GATT signatories, known as "Contracting Parties," met again two years
later to negotiate further agreements in negotiating sessions called rounds. 17
Substantive GATT law has developed through a series of agreements nego-
tiated under these rounds.' 8 The latest round of GATT negotiations, the
strains with the Soviet Union, and domestic political changes in the form of a Republican controlled
Congress in 1948. Id. at 4, 8.
9 SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 5, at 219.
10 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT
1947]. "GATT" refers to the GATT of 1947, as later rectified, amended or modified. The twenty-three
nations are: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, (Republic of) China, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan,
Southern Rhodesia, United Kingdom, and United States.
I I SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 5, at 219.
12 Id.
13 OLIVER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 1-2
(1985?4 SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 5, at 219.
15 Id. at 220.
16 LONG, supra note 13, at I.
17 The signatories met at the Annecy Round in 1949. SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 5, at 222.
18 Id at 219. These rounds comprise the following: 1947 Geneva Round, also known as the
General Agreement; 1949 Annecy Round; 1950-51 Torquay Round; 1955-56 Geneva Round; 1960-62
Dillon Round; 1964-67 Kennedy Round; and 1973-79 Tokyo Round. NIGEL GRIMWADE, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: NEW PATTERNS OF TRADE, PRODUCTION AND INVESTMENT 32, 35 (1989).
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"Uruguay Round," had the primary aims of further reducing tariff and non-
tariff barriers to trade in goods, developing a mechanism to regulate inter-
national trade in services, and eliminating quotas for textiles.19
GATT is a group of agreements designed to bind the Contracting
Parties to the process of reducing tariffs and other non-tariff barriers to trade
and to the process of eliminating discriminatory treatment in international
commerce. 20 It does so by conferring multilateral status on all bilateral
trade agreements into which a Contracting Party enters. As stated in article
I: "[A]ny advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contract-
ing party to any product originating in or destined for any other country
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting
parties."' Signatories to the GATT agree not to discriminate between their
trading partners. If the United States, a Contracting Party, grants uncondi-
tional Most Favored Nation ("MFN")22 status to another Contracting Party,
it must automatically grant those same advantages, favors, privileges, and
immunities to every other Contracting Party.
Under the original philosophy of the GATT, tariffs were preferable to
quotas.23 Tariffs are more transparent than quotas and, therefore, promote
economic efficiency.24 A manufacturer could calculate what the price of his
imported product would be with the tariff and then make a determination
whether the product could compete with the domestically-produced product.
Non-tariff barriers25  hinder trade.26  If a quota were erected, the
19 SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 5, at 222.
20 There are four core GATT concepts: (I) the principle of non-discrimination or Most Favored
Nation ('MFN"), (2) avoidance of non-tariff barriers, (3) national treatment, (4) nullification or impair-
ment. SwAN & MURPHY, supra note 5, at 223-24.
21 GATT 1947, art. 1(1), 55 U.N.T.S. at 198.
22 The United States uses the term "MFN" instead of the term "unconditional." See SWAN &
MURPHY, supra note 5, at 224.
23 GRIMWADE, supra note 18, at 32.
24 "Experts generally agree that using tariffs makes the extent of protection [for foreign goods]
clearer than other types of protection and is less trade distorting." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, I THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: URUGUAY ROUND FINAL ACT SHOULD PRODUCE
OVERALL U.S. ECONOMIC GAINS, July 1994, at 5 [hereinafter GAO I].
25 Under GATT there are more than 40 non-tariff barriers, which are broken into five groups:
quotas, voluntary export restraints, price controls, seasonal tariffs, and monitoring measures. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 2 THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: URUGUAY ROUND FINAL
ACT SHOULD PRODUCE OVERALL U.S. ECONOMIC GAINS, July 1994, at 10 [hereinafter GAO 2].
26 When monopolies are protected by a tariff, if domestic producers raise the price too much, a
foreigner can come in and undercut the domestically-produced good. This is not so with quotas. The
domestic good has "absolute protection" no matter how high the domestic price, because imports can never
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manufacturer could not easily determine if his product would be allowed
into the foreign country nor how much he would be forced to charge for that
good.
Because of their detrimental economic effect, GATT prohibits import
quotas.27 Article XI stipulates: "No prohibition or restrictions other than
duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas,
import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or main-
tained by any Contracting Party." 28 In spite of the prohibition against non-
tariff barriers, many Contracting Parties nevertheless implement quotas on
certain imported goods.29
Contracting Parties have used article XIX to suspend various
products30 from GATT obligations. Article XIX provides an "escape
clause" 31 from the provisions of the GATT when an imported product
"cause[s] or threaten[s] serious injury to domestic producers." 32 When this
happens, the Contracting Party "shall be free.., to suspend the obligations
in whole or in part or modify the concession." 33
Contracting Parties have utilized the article XIX exception for
textiles, 34 contrary to the original intent of article XIX and article I. It has
been argued that the original intent of article XIX was to allow countries to
escape from the GATT" only for "unforeseen developments" and not merely
exceed the quota. PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 226 (3d ed. 1994).
27 During the International Trade Organization ("ITOr ") Charter negotiations, the United States tried
to outlaw all non-tariff barriers. U.S. policymakers felt that tariffs were less likely to be used administra-
tively as a discriminatory measure than non-tariffs barriers. SwAN & MURPHY, supra note 5, at 236.
28 GATT 1947, art. XI(), 55 U.N.T.S. at 226.
29 Austria has quotas on cement and fertilizers. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS
ON ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE PRACTICES, Feb. 1994, at 122. Argentina has quotas on automobiles.
Id at 313. In Canada, the provincial governments have erected quotas on alcohol. Id. at 147. Italy has
seasonal limitations of agriculture. Id. at 202. Portugal has quotas on automobiles, iron and steel tubes and
pipes, and weaving machines. Id. at 247. Spain has quotas on corn and sorghum. U. S. INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION, PUB. No. 2769, 45TH REP. 1993, THE YEAR IN TRADE: OPERATION OF THE TRADE
AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 10 (June 1994) [hereinafter YEAR IN TRADE]. The United States has quotas on
dairy products, syrups, sugar-containing products, cotton, and peanuts. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, REPORT ON UNITED STATES TRADE AND INVESTMENT BARRIERS 1993: PROBLEMS OF
DOING BUSINESS WITH THE U.S, Apr. 1993, at 42.
30 Agricultural products are a well-known product which has "escaped" from GATT. See European
Economic Community Import of Beeffrom Canada GA 7T Doc L/5099 (Mar. 10, 1981), reprinted in BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 28th Supp., at 92.
31 Id.
32 GATT 1947, art. XIX(IXa), 55 U.N.T.S. at 260.
33 Id.
34 1961 Short Term Arrangement, 1962 Long Term Arrangement Regarding Cotton Textiles, 1974
Multifiber Arrangement SwAN & MURPHY, supra note 5, at 237.
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when they face foreign competition.35 This interpretation of article XIX fits
with the overall tone of the document. If a Contracting Party could escape
any time a domestic industry faced foreign competition, GATT would be
meaningless. Nevertheless, textiles have long received special protection
under article XIX. As noted by Alan C. Swan and John F. Murphy, "The
bilateral agreements negotiated within the framework of the MFA represent
what is perhaps the most sweeping departure from the prohibition contained
in article XI and from the original GATT philosophy of minimizing the use
of quantitative restrictions in favor of tariffs that would be subject to
negotiated reductions." 36
B. History of the Multifiber Arrangement
The Multifiber Arrangement ("MFA") consists of a series of bilateral
treaties imposing quotas first on cotton and then on non-cotton textiles.37 It
includes the 1961 Short Term Arrangement, the 1962 Long Term
Arrangement (renewed in 1967 and 1970), and the many renewals 38 of the
MFA which extend coverage to December 31, 1994, when the Uruguay
Round agreement on textiles and apparel was adopted. 39 Around 80% of
35 The escape clause can be invoked only if, as a result of obligations incurred as a Contracting
Party, "unforeseen developments" cause or threaten "serious injury" to domestic producers. GATT 1947
supra note 32, at 258, 260.
A GATT Working Party said, "Any proposal to withdraw a tariff concession in order to promote
the establishment or development of domestic production of a new or novel type of product in which over-
seas suppliers have opened up a new market is not permissible under article XIX." Withdrawal by the
United States of a Tariff Concession Under Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
GATT Rep. CP/106, § 27, Oct. 1951, (Nov. 1951).
36 SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 5, at 236-37.
37 Niels Blokker & Jan Deelstra, Towards a Termination of the Multi-fibre Arrangement?, 28 J.
WORLD TRADE 97, 100 (1994). There are 41 parties to the MFA. Seven importing countries apply bilat-
eral restraints under the MFA umbrella: Austria (6 bilateral agreements with exporting countries), Canada
(22), the EC (19), Finland (7), Norway (16), Sweden (15), United States (26). CARL B. HAMILTON & WILL
MARTIN, THE WORLD BANK, THE URUGUAY ROUND: TEXTILES TRADE AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
ELIMINATING THE MULTI-FIBRE ARRANGEMENT IN THE 1990s, INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 13 (Carl B. Hamilton ed., 1990). As of 1987, the 33 exporting
nations were Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Egypt, Hong
Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Macao, Malaysia, Malta, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, North
Korea, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Turke Uruguay, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. Id. at 42.
% The MFA was first entered into in January 1974 and lasted until December 1977. It was renewed
in January 1978, and lasted until December 1981 (MFA-il); MFA-I1 lasted from January 1982 to July
1986; MFA-IV from August 1986 to July 1991 (Hamilton & Martin, supra note 37, at 42); MFA-V from
August, 1991 to December 31, 1992, and MFA-VI ran from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1994.
YEAR IN TRADE, supra note 29, at 10.
39 YEAR IN TRADE, supra note 29, at II.
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U.S. textile and apparel imports from less developed countries fall under
MFA quotas.40
When faced with foreign competition, countries have protected the
domestic textile and apparel industry. During the Great Depression in the
1930s, international textile trade fell even as competition from Japan
increased.4 1 In response, traditional manufacturers, such as the United
Kingdom applied imperial preferences favoring current and former colo-
nies; other nations instituted the widespread use of quotas. 42 For example,
the United States passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.43 After
World War II, cheap Japanese imports were more competitive in Europe
than domestically-produced textiles.44 In response, Europeans continued to
restrict Japanese fabrics and apparel from the provisions of the General
Agreement, just as they had in the 1930s, by erecting non-tariff barriers.45
The United States did not formally exempt Japanese textiles from the
provisions of GATT, but it did propose a voluntary restraint agreement
("VRA") to which the Japanese acceded in 1957.46
With no ITO, GATT was too weak to enforce the provisions of article
XI even though such restrictions ran counter to the General Agreement.
The United States, while an economic superpower ostensibly committed to
free trade, had no persuasive power to pressure the Europeans into
complying with GATT because the U.S. Congress had refused to approve
the ITO.
Having gotten away with restricting imports of clothing from
Japanese producers, the developed countries extended non-tariff barriers to
non-Japanese producers of textiles. After the first trade barriers were
imposed on Japan, textiles and apparel imports from Hong Kong surged into
the developed countries, evading the European quotas and U.S. VRAs. 4 7 To
40 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, I TRADE POLICY REVIEW: UNITED STATES 164
(June 1994) [hereinafter I TRADE POLICY REVIEW: UNITED STATES].
41 WILLIAM I CLINE, INSTrruTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, THE FUTURE OF WORLD TRADE
IN TEXTILES AND APPAREL 146 (1987).
42 Id at 147.
43 19 U.S.C. § 1401a (1988).
44 "In the historical pattern of third-world economic development, textile manufacturing is a
preliminary stage of economic and industrial development." James L. Kenworthy, U.S-China Textile
Relations, CHINA BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 40. See Kym Anderson, The Changing Role of Fibres,
Textiles and Clothing as Economies Grow, in NEW SILK ROAD: EAST ASIA AND WORLD TEXTILES
MARKETS 1, 2-14 (Kym Anderson ed., 1992).
45 CLtNE, supra note 41, at 146.
46 The VRA was to run for five years. Id
47 Id. Japanese imports fell from 63% in 1958 to 26% in 1960. During the same period, Hong
Kong's share doubled from 14% to 28%. Id.
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combat this spillover of imports from uncontrolled areas,48 the United
States initiated the international negotiations of the Short Term
Arrangement in cotton clothing ("STA") in 196149 and the Long Term
Arrangement ("LTA") in 1962.50 Both the STA and LTA imposed an inter-
national regime limiting the growth of imports of cotton textiles and apparel
to 5% per year.5  The United States also negotiated individual bilateral
quotas with Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and Taiwan in 1971 and 1972,
restricting the import of wool and synthetic fibers.5 2
With the rising popularity of man-made fibers and the U.S. imposi-
tion of formal quotas, the increase of Asian exports exerted additional
pressure on European producers and forced European governments to agree
to a multilateral framework to control the international apparel and textile
trade.5 3 Thus, the first MFA was born.
The basic objectives of the MFA, as stated in article I, were: "[T]o
achieve the expansion of trade, the reduction of barriers to such trade and
the progressive liberalization of world trade in textile products." 54
However, the MFA has actually reduced commerce and erected more barri-
ers to trade.55
The MFA legitimized the bilateral agreements running counter to the
underlying tenets of the GATT.56 Under the umbrella of the GATT Textile
Committee, 57 a developed country negotiates separate bilateral quotas58
48 Id
49 Id. at 147
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 148.
53 Id. at 149.
54 Arrangement Regarding the International Trade in Textiles (with Annexes), art. 1(2), Dec. 20,
1973, 930 U.N.T.S. at 170. (Commonly known as MFA.)
55 HAMILTON & MARTIN, supra note 37, at 14.
56 CLINE, supra note 41, at 149; GAO 2, supra note 25, at 146.
57 The Textile Committee is composed of a representative from all MFA members. It is the frame-
work under which MFA discussions take place. For a further description of this body, see BLOKKER, supra
note 37, at 99.
58 As of December 1993, the United States had MFA bilateral agreements with 41 countries:
Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Korea, Macao, Malaysia, Mexico,
Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Turkey, and Uruguay. In addition, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Chinese Taipei, Haiti, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Mauritius, Nepal, Oman, and United Arab Emirates also had bilateral agreements with the United States. I
TRADE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 40, at 165. These agreements impose quotas on 1,200 items of apparel.
Greg Rushford, GATSpat; Textile Lobby Tangled Up in Trade Policy, LEGAL TIMES at I (Aug. 8, 1994),
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File. About 67% of imports are under quota. GENERAL
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with individual exporting countries in order to set quotas and quota growth
rates.59 U.S. policy-makers preferred the international aspect of the MFA
over the strictly bilateral agreements of the past. According to textiles
expert William Cline, "They [U.S. policymakers] considered that the result
would do less damage to the multilateral trade apparatus under GATT, that
it would ensure a sharing of the import burden by Europe, and that it would
avoid still more restrictive and permanent quotas that might otherwise be
enacted by Congress." 60
Textile-producing countries went along with the MFA for two
reasons. First, they anticipated that the developed countries would again
restrict their imports, and thus, reasoned that an international format for
such restrictions was a "lesser evil than unbridled arbitrary actions. 6 1
Second, although the MFA allowed quotas, importing countries were
obliged to provide for an annual growth rate in imports.62 MFA-163 phased
down European bilateral restrictions against Eastern Europe and Less
Developed Countries, 64 allowed imports to grow at 6% annually under each
quota, and added "swing" adjustments, 65 "carry-forwards" 66 and "carry-
overs" 67 for more flexibility.68  As the textile-producing countries had
already agreed to trade restrictions, there was no one to complain that article
IX of GATT had been violated.
Successive MAs have become more restrictive. 69 Annual growth
rates have fallen to below 6% and the number of fibers covered by the
restrictions has grown.70 As textile expert William Cline has noted, "[T]he
flexibility that permitted rapid growth in imports . ..has by now been
largely eliminated." 7 1
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, 2 TRADE POLICY REVIEW: UNITED STATES 36-37 (June 1994)
[hereinafter 2 TRADE POLICY REVIEW: UNITED STATES].
59 YEAR IN TRADE, supra note 29, at 10.
60 CLINE, supra note 4 1, at 149.
61 Sanjoy Bagchi, The Integration of the Textile Trade into GA7T, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 31 (1994).
62 Id.
63 See supra note 38.
64 CLINE, supra note 41, at 150.
65 Swing adjustments allow a transfer between product categories in the same year. HAMILTON &
MARTIN, supra note 37, at 13.
66 Up to 5% from the following year's quota can be carried forward. Id. at 14.
67 Up to 10% of the unused part of last year's quotas can be carried over to the next year. Id.
68 Id. at 13-14.
69 Id at 14; GAO 2, supra note 25, at 146-47.
70 HAMILTON & MARTIN, supra note 37, at 14. Silk blends and other vegetable fibers have been
included. Id.
71 CLINE, supra note 41, at 14.
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Recent agreements have restricted more of Hong Kong's and China's
imports. Bilateral treaties with Hong Kong have cut the annual rate of
growth of import quotas to 1% or less; they have also extended coverage to
silk, linen and ramie products. 72 China's rate of growth is also more
restricted. Under the most recent Sino-U.S. bilateral treaty,73 Chinese
imports are limited to 1% to 2% annual growth. 74 The previous agreements
allowed them to grow at a rate of 5% to 6%.75 China also has tighter caps
on textiles in disputed categories.76
C. Comparative Advantage
Under Classical economic theory, 77 every country has a comparative
advantage 78 in some product. It is relatively cheaper to specialize in
producing that item and sell it on the world market than to remain economi-
cally self-sufficient. 79  As The Economist noted when discussing
development, "Textiles are a good bet for a country bent on
industrialization. Clothes are an essential commodity and making them
requires plenty of people."8 0 China is a densely populated country with
unskilled labor.8 i Kym Anderson makes a similar point: "Since many
(though by no means all) textile and clothing production activities tend to
be intensive in the use of unskilled labor, they would be among the items
initially exported by a newly industrializing, densely populated country."8 2
72 Id
73 Dan Martin, Mending the Textile Rift, CHINA Bus. REV., May-June 1994, at 12 [hereinafter
Martin, Textile Rifi]. In 1994, Hong Kong negotiated a yearly quota of 260 million square meters of cloth
and 786 million finished garments under the bilateral treaty with the United States.
74 Id. Simon Beck, HK Protests Against Unfair Proposals on Textile Quotas, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Aug. 29, 1994, at 1. China's quota is slightly higher. Id.
75 Martin, Textile Rift, supra note 73, at 12.
76 Id. When China receives formal complaints about exceeding its quota in a particular category, it
must limit exports in that category to 7.5% of the number of garments entering the United States in the two
months prior to the complaint being filed. Id. In the past, this cap had been 15.5%. Id.
77 David Ricardo is the most famous economist to be associated with the Classical school. SWAN &
MURPHY, supra note 5, at 195.
78 For an introduction to comparative advantage, see KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 26, at II-
37.
79 Although one country has an absolute cost advantage in producing both products, it is more effi-
cient for both countries to specialize in one good and import the other. SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 5, at
195.
80 ECONOMIST, Indonesia's Ripping Yarn, Jan. 9, 1993, at 62.
81 Kym Anderson, China and the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, in HAMILTON & MARTIN, supra note
37, at 140.
82 Id. at 139.
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China enjoys a comparative advantage in the production of silk 83 and
in the manufacturing of men's and women's cotton trousers, and men's and
women's cotton shirts.8 4 In the highly labor-intensive aspect of apparel
manufacturing 85 which have similar productivity rates, China derives its
comparative advantage from the fact that Chinese workers are paid less than
workers from other countries, only about forty cents per hour.8 6
Exploiting its own comparative advantage, Hong Kong has special-
ized in the more skilled aspects of the textile industry. The garment
industry in Hong Kong also boasts more "sophisticated factories"8 7 and
employs greater capital improvements than China. Hong Kong garment
workers enjoy a comparative advantage in cutting.88 Factories in Hong
Kong use state-of-the-art lasers to cut large quantities of fabric quickly and
precisely. 89 These capital improvements have allowed Hong Kong to
compete even with its higher wage of about eight dollars per hour.90 It is
only natural that Hong Kong would exploit its comparative advantage in the
cutting aspect of the textile business and combine it with China's compara-
tive advantage in sewing.
D. Uruguay Round
The eighth and final round of GATT established the long-awaited
World Trade Organization ("WTO") 9 1 which will absorb GAT]r, create the
"third pillar" of post-WWII economic order,92 and slash tariffs by more than
83 Dan Martin, The Silk Surprise, CHINA Bus. REV., May-June 1994, at 13 [hereinafter Martin, Silk
Surprise].
84 This is according to Martin Trust, President of Mast Industries, Inc., sourcing arm of The Limited.
Jim Ostroff, Brouhaha Brews Over Bid for Origin Rule Changes, DAILY NEWS RECORD, July 27, 1994, at
3.
85 Former Chief Textile Negotiator, Ron Sorini, says that only 2% of the labor of making a T-shirt is
attributed to cutting. Behr, supra note 4.
86 Id The United States has a comparative advantage in man-made fibers. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK, Jan 1994, at 9-8. The
average U.S. textile worker is paid $8.37 per hour. Id The United States also has a comparative advan-
tage in denim, home textiles (i.e., towels), and in men's shirts and pants, using wrinkle-resistant fabrics. 2
STANDARD& POOR'S INDUSTRIAL SURVEYS, July 1994, at T82, T83, T90.




91 GATT DRAFT IMPLEMENTING PROPOSAL, supra note 3.
92 The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are the other two pillars. Robert Evans,
New Trade Body Launched with 81 Members, Reuter European Business Rep., Jan. 4, 1995, available in
LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
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a third on average.93 Global income is conservatively forecasted to increase
by $200 billion per year because of the increased trade resulting from the
provisions of the Uruguay Round.94 The Clinton Administration argues that
implementation of the Uruguay Round will produce half a million jobs in
the United States.' 95 Republicans also expect it to "stimulate billions of
dollars in new commerce. '96
.WTO also authorizes a Textile Monitoring Body ("TMB") to replace
GATT's Textile Surveillance Board, which oversees a complete phase-out
of the MFA,9 7 bringing textile and apparel in line with the General
Agreement. As products are integrated into the GATT, they immediately
become subject to normal GATT rules.98 All textile and apparel quotas for
WTO members will end ten years after the Uruguay Round Agreement goes
into effect on July 1, 1995. 99
Under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Apparel,
textile quotas will be reduced in three successive steps and one large
leap.100 All members of the WTO will be subject to this phase-out whether
they are signatories to the MFA or not.101 Countries with MFA quotas must
remove those quotas on 16% of the total volume of textile imports in
1995.102 In 1998, they must remove an additional 17%; and in 2002 an
93 Id.
94 ECONOMIST, World Trade: From Uruguay to Marrakesh, Apr. 16, 1994, at 73.
95 David E. Rosenbaum, Big Push on Trade: Lining Up the Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1994, at
Al.
96 Thomas R. Friedman, Dole Explains Trade Treaty Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1994, at D2.
97 GA 7-T extile Board Chairman Calls for More Cooperation with WTO Monitoring, II Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No 48, at 1898 (Dec. 7, 1994).
98 YEAR IN TRADE, supra note 29, at 10.
99 Martin, Silk Surprise, supra note 83, at 13.
100 YEAR IN TRADE, supra note 29, at 10.
Summary of Textile Agreement
Stage/Period Year number Share of imports to be Increase in quota
integrated growth rate
Jan. 1, '95-Dec. 31, '97 1-3 16% 16%
Jan. 1, '98-Dec. 31, 2002 4-7 17% 25%
Jan. 1, '02-Dec. 31, '04 8-10 18% 27%
Jan. 1, 2002 49% --
101 YEAR IN TRADE, supra note 29, at 9.
102 Martin, Textile Rift, supra note 73 at 13.
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additional 18% must be lifted.'0 3 The remaining 49% must be removed by
2005.104
During each stage, products to be phased out will be chosen from all
four textile categories: (1) tops and yams, (2) fabrics, (3) made-up textiles,
(4) clothing. 10 5 During the first years of the agreement the United States
will probably remove quotas on less import-sensitive items and leave more
important categories, such as apparel, 106 under quotas until 2005.107
The Uruguay Round Agreement also stipulates that all quota levels
for textiles remaining under quota be phased out by July 1, 2005.108 From
1995-1998, quota growth rates for textiles will rise 16% per year. 109 From
1998-2002, they will rise another 25% annually. 110 From 2002-2005 there
will be another 27% increase so that by July 1, 2005 all textile trade will be
covered by WTO. 111 For example, if prior to January 1, 1995 the growth
rate on a garment category had been 6%, on January 1, 1995 the growth rate
would have become 6.96% (a growth rate increase of 16%).112 Under this
"growth-on-growth" method, the original percent rate would increase to an
11% growth rate by January 1, 2002.113
The Uruguay Round also requires that all WTO members improve
access in the domestic market for imported textiles by reducing or eliminat-
ing non-tariff barriers and facilitating customs, administrative, and licensing
procedures. 1 4 The TMB will adjust the quota growth rates for countries
that do not improve market access. 115
Developed countries have one final safeguard when implementing the
MFA phase-out. If any surges in imports occur during the phase-out period
for products not yet integrated into GATT, the importing country can set
103 Id. at 13-14.
104 Id. at 14.
105 YEAR IN TRADE, supra note 29, at 10.
106 GAO 2, supra note 25, at 149.
107 Martin, Textile Rift, supra note 73, at 14. According to United States Trade Representative
("USTR'), the first products to be integrated into GATT would probably be those that are already quota-
free or goods with low import-to U.S.-production ratios (i.e., textured filament yam). The last to integrate
would be fabrics, such as poplin, broadcloth, and wool apparel goods that have a high import-to-U.S.-
production ratio. GAO 2, supra note 25, at 148-49.




112 GAO 2, supra note 25, at 149.
113 Id.
114 YEAR IN TRADE, supra note 29, at II.
115 Id.
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quotas on these products that "cause or threaten serious damage to the
domestic industry."116 This language is identical to the "escape clause" of
article XIX in the General Agreement which led to the MFA in the first
place. However, this safeguard provision, whether by mutual agreement or
unilateral, is subject to review by the TMBI17 and is limited to three years
or until the product is integrated into GATT, whichever is shorter.118
Article XIX of the General Agreement had no governing body to review
such deviations from the treaty and there was no time limit.
China, while a signatory to the MFA, is not a member of GATT and
is bound by the Sino-U.S. bilateral treaty until it officially joins
GATT/WTO. 119 The United States has formally agreed to sponsor China's
renewed bid for entry to the WTO. 120 Once it joins WTO,121 China can
benefit from these phase-outs. However, as China will join WTO after the
phase-outs have begun, the phase-outs will not be applied retroactively.122
For example, if China were to join in 1999, the United States would be
obliged to raise China's quota growth rate from 1% to 1.25% by 2002.123
So for the next eight years, even under future events construed most
favorably toward China, these phase-outs will have little effect in increasing
the amount of Chinese textiles entering the United States. 124
Hong Kong, an MFA signatory and GATT Contracting Party, is
expected to be a WTO member in the near future.125 Hong Kong will
maintain its status as a separate customs territory even after it reverts back
116 Id.
117 Presently, there is a disagreement over the composition of the 11-seat TMB. A potential
solution would seat five representatives from exporting countries, four from importing countries and one
from a country which is both. Resolution of the issue has been tabled for now. Sheel Kohli, Starting Date
for Trade Body Agreed, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 9, 1994, at 14, available in LEXIS, NEWS
Library, CURNWS File.
118 YEARIN TRADE, supra note 29, at 11.
119 Martin, Textile Rift, supra note 73, at 13.
120 Patrick E. Tyler, US., China Will End Trade Rift, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1995, at DI.
121 For more on China's GATT application, see id
122 Martin, Textile Rift, supra note 73, at 14.
123 Id.
124 In comparison, the lifting of MFA quotas will bring good results to GATT members, such as
South Korea and Indonesia. In Korea, 90% of textile and clothing exports is presently under quotas.
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, I TRADE POLICY REVIEW: KOREA, 168 (1992). When the
quotas are removed, previously restrained Korean textile industry will be able to produce to its full world
market potential. The Indonesian textile industry will also be freed from MFA quotas. This should mean
more garments entering the developed countries because textiles are the most important export-oriented
manufacturing activity in Indonesia. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, I TRADE POLICY
REvIEW: INDONESIA 154 (1991).
125 Evans, supra note 92 quoting WTO Director General, Peter Sutherland.
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to China in 1997.126 Article 6 of the Sino-British Joint Declaration states:
"The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the status of a
free port and a separate customs territory."127 The Chinese National
People's Congress further elucidated this point when it passed the Basic
Law. Article 116 of the Basic Law permits Hong Kong to "participate in
relevant international organizations and international trade agreements
(including preferential trade arrangements), such as the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade and arrangements regarding international trade in
textiles. Export quotas, tariff preferences and other similar arrangements..
. remain valid."'128 Because it is not yet a WTO member, Hong Kong, like
China, cannot enjoy the MFA phase-outs. Thus the changes in U.S.
Customs rulings, which are used to regulate imports, are even more
crucial. 129
HI. URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT
A. Fast-Track Authority
Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which includes
a section on textiles and apparel rules of origin, 130 under fast-track authori-
zation. "Fast-track" grants the President the authority to negotiate
agreements with only an up-or-down vote from Congress; no amendments
are allowed.' 3 1 As noted in the New York Times, "[t]hat authority is
considered essential to ward off special interest amendments that could
doom a trade agreement."' 132 Without such a "yes-or-no" vote, the 535
126 Text of Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hongkong, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS
SERVICE, Sept. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINA File.
127 Id
128 ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANGGANG TEBIE XINGZHANGQU JIBEN FA, Di
YIBAIY1SHILIU T1AO: XIANGGANG TEBIE XINGZHENGQU WEI DANDU DE GUANSHUI Di Qu [BASIC LAW OF
THE HONG KONG ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], art. 116, Apr. 4, 1990,
translated in 2 CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS: FOREIGN ZONES AND CMES 100-010, (CCH INrL
1993).
129 Hong Kong would experience cuts of up to HK$41 billion in domestic exports with the elimi-
nation of MFA quotas. Amy Chew, Uruguay Round to Boost China Trade; Full Implementation Set to
Increase Exports by 26.5pc, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 26, 1994, at 1.
130 Uruguay Round, supra note 1, § 334.
131 Rosenbaum, supra note 95.
132 Friedman, supra note 96.
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Members of Congress might amend the treaty which the President had
negotiated, thus imperiling the legislation. 133
While Congress has agreed not to offer amendments to the Final Act
of the Uruguay Round itself, Congress still gives the President input on how
to implement the agreement in accordance with U.S. law.134  The
Congressional version of implementation legislation passed both the House
Ways and Means Committee 35 and the Senate Finance Committee. 136
After taking such views of both houses into account, the White House
submitted the completed package to Congress for a final vote on September
27, 1994.137
B. Rules of Origin
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act legislates changes in textiles
and apparel source of origin rules.138 From January 1, 1996, the place of
assembly will determine the origin of an article of clothing for customs
purposes. 139 This change cannot be properly understood apart from the
history of U.S. Customs rulings.
1. History of Customs Regulations
Over the past decade, U.S. Customs regulations have been altered to
protect domestic manufacturers from foreign competition. Prior to 1984,
133 Collapse of Uruguay Round Talks Shows Unity of U.S. Farm-Business Interests, Kleckner Says,
8 Int'l Trade Rep., (BNA) No. 2 at 49 (Jan. 9, 1991).
134 Title III [of H.R. 5110 and S. 2467] Implements in US. Domestic Law Various Provisions of the
Uruguay Round Agreements, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) (Sept. 29, 1994), available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, CURNWS File. Subtitle D deals with textiles, and § 334 lays out Rules of Origin for
Textile and Apparel. Id
135 House Ways and Means Approves Plan to Implement Uruguay Round Agreement, I I Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 30 at 1162 (July 27, 1994).
13 6 Finance Panel Passes Proposal Implementing Uruguay Round, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No.
31, at 1196 (Aug. 2, 1994).
137 Thomas R. Friedman, Clinton Sends Congress Global Treasure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1994, at
D2.
138 Uruguay Round, supra note I, § 334.
139 Press Release from Office of Congressman Benjamin L. Cardin, Member of the House Ways
and Means Committee and author of the Cardin Amendment: Rule of Origin or Textiles and Apparel
[hereinafter Cardin Press Release].
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the United States followed "substantial transformation" rules for customs
classification. The regulations read:
'Country of origin' means the country of manufacture,
production, or growth of any article of foreign origin entering
the United States. Further work or material added to an article
must effect a substantial transformation in order to render such
other country the 'country of origin' within the meaning of this
part. 140
An article was judged to be of origin of the place where it last underwent a
substantial transformation. There was no definition of "substantial
transformation." Sweaters cut in China but stitched and embroidered in
Hong Kong fell under the Hong Kong quota.141
Faced with competition from sweaters embroidered in Hong Kong,
the United States reinterpreted the regulation in 1984. Domestic sweater
manufacturers pressured the Customs Bureau to change the classification to
"place of cutting" in order to protect the U.S. market. 142
Under Customs Regulations 143 promulgated in 1984, apparel is
deemed to be made in the country where the fabric is cut.144 "[T]extiles or
textile products... imported into the customs territory of the United States,
are a product of a particular foreign territory or country... [where the arti-
cle] has been substantially transformed by means or a substantial
manufacturing or processing operation into a new and different article of
commerce."145
While there is no definition of "substantial transformation" in this
regulation either, there are seven factors to which Customs is supposed to
pay attention when deciding whether a "substantial manufacturing or
processing operation" has taken place. 146  The regulations say: "[A]
140 19C.F.R.§ 134.1(b)(1984).
141 Behr, supra note 4.
142 Id.
143 T.D. 84-171, 18 Treas. Dec. C.B. 480-498 (Jan.-Dec. 1984).
144 "For the purpose of enforcing the Multifiber Agreement, the origin of a textile or apparel good
is established based on where the material in the good is 'cut'." Cardin Press Release, supra note 141.
GATT criticized this practice for "generat[ing] problems of consistency in the origin determination, as the
statute under which the origin is required (e.g., preferential scheme, marking, administration of quota, etc.)
may lead to the determination of a different origin for the same import. I TRADE POLICY REVIEW, supra
note 40, at 166.
145 19C.F.R. § 12.130(b) (1984).
146 19 C.F.R. § 12.130(bX2) (1984).
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comparison will be made between the article or material before the manu-
facturing or processing operation and the article in its condition after the
manufacturing or processing operation."147
The regulations explicitly state that sewing is not a substantial trans-
formation. The Discussion section reads: "[N]o article or material shall be
considered to have been substantially transformed in a particular foreign
territory or country... by virtue of having merely undergone... the joining
together by sewing."' 148 Therefore, garments cut in Hong Kong and
transshipped to China for sewing still retain the "Made in Hong Kong"
classification because Hong Kong is where the last substantial transforma-
tion, i.e., cutting, took place. U.S. Custom rulings coupled with Hong
Kong's comparative advantage in cutting and China's comparative advan-
tage in sewing encouraged the emergence of Chinese-Hong Kong
partnerships to circumvent the 1984 source-in-origin ruling 149 (similar to
the way Japanese factories moved to Hong Kong to side-step European
quotas erected after WWII). The Clinton Administration estimates that 10%
of the $4 billion of textile imports entering the United States from Hong
Kong are really assembled in China.]5 0
2. Uruguay Round Reclassification
Under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, it appears that Congress
has decided to reclassify the origin of textiles to where the garment is sewn
-in other words, counter to the 1984 Customs Regulations. Thus, clothing
cut in Hong Kong and sewn in China would be classified as "Made in
China." The law states: "[T]he good shall be considered to originate in...
the country... in which the most important assembly or manufacturing
process occurs." 151 If that cannot be determined, then origin is deemed to
be of origin of the "last country... in which important assembly or manu-
facturing occurs."15 2 The regulations concerning this provision have not yet
147 T.D. 84-171, supra note 143, at 483.
148 19C.F.R. § 12.130(b)(1)(1984).
149 Former Chief Textile Negotiator, Ron Sorini, quoted in Behr, supra note 4.
150 Id in 1991-93 the U.S. Customs Service estimated that, annually, Chinese textiles worth $2
billion were illegally transshipped into the United States. Between 1990-93, China over-shipped 50
percent of 88 of its categories negotiated under the bilateral treaty. The United States faults China for not
"meeting its legal obligation to issue export visas for no more than the amount of goods for which it had
quota." YEAR IN TRADE, supra note 29, at 102-03.
151 Uruguay Round, supra note I, § 334(bX3) and § 334(b)(3)(A).
152 Id. § 334(bX3)(B)
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been written, 153 however, it seems certain that the intent of Congress was to
change the country of origin from the "place of cutting" to "place of
sewing" as this press release from one of the principle sponsors of the
amendment makes clear:
Cardin Amendment
Rule of Origin for Textiles and Apparel
Current Law:
For the purpose of enforcing the Multi-fiber Agreement, the
origin of a textile or apparel good is established based on
where the material in the good is "cut."
Amendment:
From January 1, 1996, for all customs law practices, the origin
of textile and apparel goods will be established by where the
goods are "assembled." 154
If one looks to the other house, it is equally apparent that the Senate
intended the regulations to stipulate place of sewing. When trying to pass
the Congressional version of the implementing legislation through in the
Finance Committee, Senator John Breaux of Louisiana 55 authored an
amendment 56 which was more protectionist than the bill Representative
Cardin offered. 157 (The Cardin version was eventually passed into law by
both houses). 15s In a 10-10 vote, the Committee defeated the Breaux
Amendment in which Congress would have legislated that the origin of a
153 "Such rules shall be promulgated in final form not later than July I, 1995." Id § 334 (a).
154 Cardin Press Release, supra note 139.
155 Fruit of the Loom is the largest private industrial employer in Louisiana, employing 7,000
people. When asked about his ties to Fruit of the Loom, Mr. Breaux responded, "they send me new
underwear every day." Joyce Barrett, Committee OK of Origin Bill Still in Doubt; Senate Finance
Committee Approval of Proposal to Change Rule of Origin for Apparel Remains in Question, DAILY NEWS
RECORD, July 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Barrett,
Committee OK].
156 The Breaux Amendment garnered lots of publicity, including a Wall Street Journal article
denouncing its effect on world trade. Review and Outlook: Turning Trade Inside Out, WALL ST. J., July
25, 1994, at Ai4.
157 H.R.5110, 103dCong., 2dsess, (1994).
158 S. 2467 103d Cong., 2d sess., (1994).
158 Uruguay Round, supra note I, § 334.
MAY 1995
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
garment is the place of assembly. 159 Breaux's proposed amendment would
have given the Treasury Department no leeway in writing the regulation it
would be as if Congress wrote the regulation. 160 In the opinion of one
Congressional staffer, Mr. Breaux wanted such a detailed amendment
"because [t]he Treasury Department is not likely to write as stiff a rule [as]
textile-state legislators would."' 161 If the Breaux amendment had passed, it
is likely that this more stringent language would have been incorporated
into the President's bill because Mr. Cardin had already lined up support for
introducing Mr. Breaux's version in the House.162
C. Protectionist Effect of New Customs Designation
The passage of the place-of-sewing rules of origin will protect U.S.
apparel manufacturers from Chinese competitors beginning January 1, 1996
when the law goes into effect. 163 Contracts in the garment industry are
typically locked in two years in advance.164 Major U.S. retailers, like The
Limited, have set up partnerships with Chinese-Hong Kong enterprises. 165
The contracts negotiated with these enterprises were entered into prior to
any change in the law. Thus, retailers anticipated that some of the garments
produced would fall under the Hong Kong quota.166 With the abrupt
change in designation that the new law brings about, some garments, previ-
ously classified as "Made in Hong Kong," will be deemed "Made in China."
Since Chinese quotas are already full,167 these articles will be denied entry
to the United States. 168 For the next two or more years U.S. retailers will be
159 Joyce Barrett, Senate Panel Scraps Textile Plan that Would Alter GATT Origin Rule; Senate
Finance Committee, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, Aug. 3, 1994, at 2,
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Senate Panel].
160 Id
161 Barrett, Committee OK, supra note 155.
162 Christopher Lynch, aide to Representative Cardin, said that his boss wanted to give the
Administration as much time as possible to re-negotiate the various bilateral treaties. Telephone interview
with Christopher Lynch, aide to Representative Cardin on November 2, 1994. The Clinton Administration
gave mixed signals on whether it supported the Breaux Amendment. Officially it told diplomats from
Asian textile-producing countries that the White House opposed the Breaux Amendment, but Clinton's
Chief Textile Negotiator, Jennifer Hillman, gave so much backroom support to the amendment that insid-
ers doubt that the bill could have progressed as far as it did without the Administration's support. Ostroff,
supra note 84.
163 Cardin Press Release, supra note 139.
164 Rushford, supra note 58.
165 Behr, supra note 4.
166 Id
167 Ostroff, supra note 84.
168 Behr, supra note 4.
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unable to complete contracts previously negotiated with foreign manufac-
turers. 169
If the clothing from these Hong Kong-Chinese partnerships is
prohibited by quota from entering the United States, retailers will have to
purchase additional garments elsewhere, possibly at higher prices. With its
under-utilized quotas,170 these goods will probably be assembled in Hong
Kong. 17 1 That is expected to add 15% more to the price than if the garment
had been produced in China under the old designation. 172 One importer
estimates, "If we had to assemble apparel in Hong Kong with their higher
wages, producers would charge us more for the product and we would raise
the price for consumers." 173 The cost of such protectionism is passed on to
consumers in the form of higher prices. 17 4
U.S. manufacturers hope to sell their garments domestically when
some of the Chinese goods are excluded from competing. "If apparel [were]
to be manufactured in Hong Kong, obviously, the price would go up and I
presume U.S.-made apparel would be more competitive," noted Larry
Martin, Director of Government Relations, American Apparel
Manufacturers. 175 By limiting imports of silk, U.S. manufacturers hope to
sell more "high end" U.S. cotton products. 176
IV. CONCLUSION
A. Proposed Solution
The United States should change source in origin rules back to the
pre-1984 standard, place of assembly, in order to harmonize U.S. Customs
169 Rushford, supra note 58.
170 Beck, supra note 74.
171 Retailers could try to find alternative manufacturers elsewhere in Southeast Asia. However,
most countries export close to their full MFA quota limits. Even with the gradual reduction of MFA quotas
for GATT/WTO member countries, there will not be enough quota available to absorb the products that
had been produced in these Hong Kong-Chinese partnerships in the near future. This is especially true if
the United States integrates the most import-sensitive items last.
172 Barrett, Committee OK, supra note 155.
173 Ostroff, supra note 84 (quoting Martin Trust, President of Mast Industries, sourcing arm of the
Limited). Leslie Wexner, Chairman of the Limited, predicts that the change in law could cost his company
more than $500 million yearly. Behr, supra note 4.
174 GAO 1,supra note 24, at 12.
175 Ostroff, supra note 84, at 3.
176 Martin, Silk Surprise, supra note 83, at 13.
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rulings with the rest of the world; 177 these changes should take effect from
January 1, 1997 instead of January 1, 1996. This proposed two-year time
frame for implementation would fall within the three-year time limit allow-
able under GATT. 178 In addition, it would not affect previously negotiated
deals, many of which were finalized two years prior to the change in the
law. From the date of passage forward, U.S. retailers would enter into new
contracts fully abreast of the change.
Postponing implementation of the legislation by one year would also
stave off a possible Chinese boycott of other U.S. goods and services. 179 In
1983, when the United States put unilateral quotas on Chinese-made
clothing, China retaliated by refusing to purchase $500 million of other
U.S.-produced items. 180 Major U.S. manufacturers' 8' and exporters like
General Electric, Caterpillar, and American Telephone and Telegraph worry
that the change in textile origin designations will "damage prospects for
overseas sales [of their own products] in the future." 8 2 A lobbyist for
retailers and Fortune 500 companies put it succinctly: "While it is unusual
for a company that makes tractors or light bulbs to weigh in on a textile
matter, we made the point that if the Clinton Administration really cares
about market opening[s] overseas, we have to keep our own hands
clean."'183
The changes in origin should apply equally to all countries, including
the United States. Proponents of "place of assembly" Customs rules argue
that it will bring the United States in line with GATT harmonization obliga-
tions; 184 however, this argument is somewhat duplicitous. Some garments
cut in the United States and assembled in Caribbean nations are exported as
a "U.S. product."s 5 This allows the United States to export a Caribbean-
177 Even industry insiders expect that the WTO will approve rules of origin designating that the
origin should be where a garment is made and not where it is cut. Barrett, Senate Panel, supra note 159.
178 Id
179 Rushford, supra note 58.
180 Id
181 Executives at retailers, such as Federated Department Stores, J.C. Penney, Kmart, Montgomery
Ward, Sears, Spiegel, The Gap, The Limited, May Department Stores, Baums, and the National Retail
Federation, also opposed the legislation. Ostroff, supra note 84.
182 Rushford, supra note 58.
183 Id
184 Interview with Christopher Lynch, supra note 162.
185 Ostroff, supra note 84.
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made article much the same way Hong Kong had been exporting Chinese-
made garments. 186
By enacting the legislation in January 1997 and encouraging our
trading partners to apply the same standards (even to the United States'
immediate detriment), the United States would set a better tone for free
trade and the WTO. Abrupt changes in Customs designations may actually
be a violation of GATT. The Agreement on Rules of Origin to harmonize
trade states plainly that there shall be "no retroactive application of changes
in origin rules or in new rules of origin."' 8 7  Rules must not be "trade
disruptive, distorting or restrictive."'' 88 These Customs rules, effective
January 1996, are all three: they restrict trade from China, thereby disrupt-
ing and distorting trade from China and Hong Kong.18 9
Furthermore, by enacting this protectionist legislation, Congress is
violating the spirit of the Uruguay Round, a major goal of which was to
integrate textiles into GATT.190 By implementing Customs rules changes in
such a short time frame, Congress is making an end-run around the treaty.
This can only weaken GATT in the long term.
Senators from both parties lamented that the source in origin
amendments would hurt GATT. "It will kill GATT," said Senator Bob
Packwood. "I can't say how strongly it will jeopardize this agreement."' 19 1
While the Senator meant that the amendments would jeopardize passage of
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, his disgruntlement can also be read
more broadly: Congress' new law implementing the origin rules change
will jeopardize the impact of this agreement in other aspects of world trade.
Senator Bill Bradley agreed with this latter sentiment: "A lot of effort went
into negotiating the GATF agreement, and the worse [sic] thing we can do
is undo it by these amendments."' 192
186 While it is acknowledged that these items are deemed "Made in USA" by the laws of the
importing countries-not U.S. law---this fact calls into question the motives of proponents of this change
who argue that origin rules should be implemented for "GA'IT obligation reasons."
Y7 EAR IN TRADE, supra note 29, at 15.
188 Id
189 Beck, supra note 74. According to The Wall Street Journal, the new law "could dislocate much
of world [textile] trade." WALL ST. J., supra note 157, at A14.
190 GAO 2, supranote 25, at 146.
191 Barrett, Senate Panel, supra note 159.
192 Id.
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B. More Efficient Way to Compensate Displaced Workers
Effecting the changes brought about by the Uruguay Round will not
be without specific costs, but those adversely affected as a result of liberal-
ized trade can be compensated in more productive ways than by erecting
protectionist barriers. About 1.6 million people are employed in the textile
and apparel industry, 19 3 including a sizable number of women and minori-
ties. 194 Between 72,000195 and 255,000196 workers will lose their jobs to
trade liberalization over the next ten years. 197 However, preserving these
jobs translates into higher costs for consumers of textile and apparel
products. 198 Researchers at the Institute for International Economics esti-
mate this protection amounted to $24 billion in 1990 alone. 199 Each apparel
job protected in 1990 cost consumers approximately $139,000 in higher
prices.20 0
As mentioned above, the United States will reap some incredible
benefits from enactment of the Uruguay Round, which include the disman-
tlement of the MFA. When MFA has been phased-out, the United States
will receive a net gain of approximately $53,000 for each textile or apparel
job that has been lost.20 1 Instead of continuing to subsidize less competitive
industries, the United States should invest a portion of that $139,000 into
worker retraining and create the infrastructure for these dislocated workers
to return to work producing something for which the United States holds a
comparative advantage.
Two major federal acts create programs designed to retrain workers
who have lost their jobs: the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act,202 and the
Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act. 20 3 While
193 Rushford, supra note 58. U.S. retailers employ more than I million people. Id.
194 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 86, at 9-1.
195 GAO 2, supra note 25, at 151 citing ITC study of Nov. 1993.
196 Id. (citing WEFA Group study, commissioned by the textile industry).
197 GAO 1, supra note 24, at 3. In a 1994 study, the Institute for International Economics esti-
mated 152,600 apparel and 16,200 textile jobs would be lost from phasing out the MFA. GAO 2, supra
note 26, at 151.
198 GAO 1, supra note 24, at 3.
199 Id at 12. This is in line with a 1986 study that estimated that "[t]he consumer cost per job
saved [through protectionism] is approximately $82,000 a year in apparel and $135,000 in textiles." CLINE,
supra note 41, at 15.
200 GAO 2, supra note 25, at 151.
201 Id
202 Trade Adjustment Assistance Trust Fund, 19 U.S.C. § 2396 (1988); see Trade Adjustment
Assistance Reform and Extension Act of 1986, 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1986).
203 GAO 1, supra note 24, at 3; 29 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982).
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these programs have several shortcomings, including long delays in offering
assistance and inadequacies in meeting the specific needs of individual
recipients, 204 it is better for Congress to help dislocated textile and apparel
workers by strengthening these and similar programs rather than erecting
protection measures which will hurt the welfare of all.
204 GAO 1, supra note 24, at 13.
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